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In today’s world there is somewhat an era of piracy. 
people copy unauthorized material from tangible 
things. To curb this danger COPYRIGHT is 
provided by law. copyright may be define as  
In Justice O'Connor's majority opinion for the 
Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises, for example, speaks of copyright 
law as the "engine of freedom of expression" To 
hold The Nation liable for copyright infringement 
for publishing excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs 
of his presidency was not, in the Court's view, to 
condone an act of private censorship. It was 
consistent with first amendment principles because 
one could count on copyright incentives to ensure 
that these memoirs would reach the public  
 
Copyright and free expression principles are, in the 
mainstream view, in harmony because copyright 
protection is only available to the "expression" of 
authors, and not to the "ideas" or information the 
authors works may contain [4]. Other authors are 
always free to express the same idea or reuse the 
information in a protected work in a different way 
than the first author. In this way, private censorship 
is avoided. Also contributing to the compatibility of 
copyright and freedom of expression principles has 
been the fair use doctrine. Howard Hughes may have 
acquired copyright in a magazine article about him 
in order to try to stop publication of an unauthorized 
biography. An appellate court rebuffed this 
attempted exercise of copyright to accomplish an act 
of private censorship, however, by finding that the 
biographer had made fair use of the article [5].
Similarly, the owner of the "Pretty Woman" 
Crew's sale of a rap parody of that song in part 
because it didn't like the meaning of this parody. 
However, the Supreme Court found persuasive the 
argument that this rap parody was a critical 
commentary on the original work that the fair use 
doctrine was intended to protect [6]. In these and 
other cases, courts have invoked fair use to prevent 
the use of copyrights to censor content of which the 
author disapproves.  
However, sometimes fair use and the 
idea/expression distinction has failed to maintain 
harmony between copyright and free expression 
principles. In the aftermath of the Harper & Row 
decision, for example, biographers and historians 
were at risk of private censorship from copyright if 
they quoted from unpublished letters or manuscripts 
of public figures, such as the reclusive J.D. Salinger 
or the controversial founder of the Scientology 
movement [7]. In response to concerns of historians 
and biographers, Congress amended the fair use 
provision to clarify that the unpublished nature of 
copyrighted works does not preclude fair use [8]. A
seeming deviation from the harmony of copyright 
and freedom of expression principles was thus 
mended, and historians and biographers, among 
others, breathed a sigh of relief. On other occasions, 
concerns about copyright’s trespass on freedom of 
expression principles have been cured by subsequent 
court decisions. Some years ago, Fred Yen 
expressed concern that the "total concept and feel" 
theory of software copyright lawsuits was so vague 
as to threaten freedom in computer programming 
expression [9]. However, later cases repudiated the 
broad "look and feel" claims [10], arguably 
rendering Yen's concerns moot.  
These doctrines and developments have bred 
complacency in most copyright scholars about the 
compatibility of copyright and freedom of 
expression principles [11]. It would be interesting to 
know whether first amendment scholars would find 
as much harmony between these principles were 
likely that such scholars would import some first 
amendment doctrines into their analysis of copyright 
issues which might inject a breath of fresh air into 
copyright discourse. While copyright scholars have 
sometimes visited the first amendment literature to 
find support for their arguments on specific 
copyright issues, virtually all of the considerable law 
review literature on the copyright/freedom of 
expression relationship has been unit-directional. 
Copyright scholars may be blinded by familiar 
doctrines from perceiving certain threats to free 
expression values that a first amendment scholar 
would easily perceive [12].
This may, however, change. The work of a number 
of young copyright scholars -- Yochai Benkler, Julie 
Cohen, Neil Netanel, and Mark Lemley, among 
them -- recognizes that the potential for disharmony 
between copyright and freedom of expression 
principles is greater than earlier generations of 
scholars may have perceived [13]. These young 
scholars have looked to first amendment and other 
constitutional principles to shore up limiting 
doctrines of copyright law or to make policy 
recommendations about how copyright law should 
evolve. As admirable as this new literature is, it 
largely ignores the fact that copyright has at least as 
long a history of being a handmaiden of censorship 
as it has a history of being the so-called "engine of 
free expression" [14]. Understanding this history 
may be valuable in assessing whether this past may 
be a prologue to a future in which copyright and 
censorship will once again be conjoined.  
So let us briefly visit this history: The Anglo-
American copyright regime grew out of practices 
and policies of the English Stationers' Guild in the 
late 15th and early 16th centuries [15]. To ensure 
harmony within the ranks, the guild established a 
registry system for staking claims in books. 
Members entered into the guild register the names of 
the books in which they claimed printing rights [16],
whereupon other guild members were expected to 
enforcement system enabled guild members to 
resolve disputes amongst themselves over rights in 
particular books. While some stationers in this era 
were surely noble fellows who sought to enlighten 
the public, the private copyright system of the pre-
modern era mainly functioned to regulate the book 
trade to ensure that members of the guild enjoyed 
monopolies in the books they printed.  
This system was, however, conducive to taking on a 
second function. Conveniently for English 
authorities, the guild's practices provided an 
infrastructure for controlling (i.e., suppressing) 
publication of heretical and seditious materials. The 
English kings and queens were quite willing to grant 
to the Stationers Guild control over the publication 
of books in the realm in exchange for the guilds 
promise to refrain from printing such dangerous 
materials [17]. Until its abolition, the Star Chamber 
was available to back up judgments emanating from 
the stationers private enforcement and censorship 
system.  
If the pre-modern copyright system promoted 
freedom of expression by making books more 
widely available, this was an incidental byproduct of 
the market that arose for books, not an intended 
purpose of the then-prevailing copyright system. Far 
more harmonious was the relationship between 
copyright and censorship in that era. Men burned at 
the stake for writing texts that were critical of the 
Crown or of established religion. The stationers 
copyright regime was part of the apparatus aimed at 
ensuring that these texts would not be printed or 
otherwise be widely accessible to the public.  
The development that ushered in the modern era of 
copyright was the English Parliaments passage of 
the Statute of Anne in 1710 [18]. On its face, this 
statute was not only a repudiation of several 
principal tenets of the stationers copyright system; it 
was also a redirection of copyright's purpose away 
from censorship and toward freedom of expression 
among printers and booksellersthat is, to break the 
stranglehold that major players in the Stationers' 
Company had over the book trade. Insofar as that 
monopoly continued in revised form, the statute 
provided recourse for those injured by excessive 
prices of books.  
The key aspects of the Statute of Anne for achieving 
these goals were these: First, the act granted rights to 
authors, not to publishers. Second, it did so for the 
utilitarian purpose of inducing learned men to write 
and publish books. Third, the act established a larger 
societal purpose for copyright, namely, to promote 
learning. Fourth, it granted rights only in newly 
authored books. Thereafter, ancient books were in 
the public domain and could be printed by anyone. 
Fifth, it limited the duration of copyright to fourteen 
year terms (renewable for another fourteen years if 
the author was living at the end of that term), thus 
abolishing perpetual copyrights [19]. Sixth, the 
statute conferred rights of a limited character (not to 
control all uses, but to control the printing and 
reprinting of protected works). Seventh, it imposed a 
responsibility on publishers to deposit copies of their 
works with designated libraries. Eighth, it provided a 
system for redressing grievances about overpriced 
books.  
While it took about fifty additional years for pre-
modern system to die out [20], the modern law of 
copyright emerged from the Statute of Anne's 
precepts. Censorship held no place of honor in this 
new copyright system which, in the main, embraced 
Enlightenment values that also influenced the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution. The clause of this 
constitution that empowers Congress to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts by securing to 
authors and inventors an exclusive right in their 
respective writings and discoveries for limited times 
should be viewed in historical context as an 
American endorsement of England's repudiation of 
the speech-suppressing, anti-competitive and 
otherwise repressive pre-modern copyright system 
Statute of Anne. Core elements of the Statute of 
Anne are reflected in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8's purpose 
("to promote Science"), in the persons to whom 
rights were to be granted ("authors"), and in the 
duration of rights ("for limited times").  
Marci Hamilton has sometimes asserted that the 
original Constitution did not include a provision on 
freedom of speech because the framers had done 
everything necessary to ensure a healthy system of 
free expression by authorizing enactment of a 
copyright law [21]. Though I would not go that far, I 
would agree that the constitutional copyright clause, 
properly construed, embodies first amendment and 
anti-monopoly principles. Because of this, I agree 
with Professor Hamilton that there is a "dormant 
copyright clause" waiting to be reawakened in the 
case law -- and hopefully in Congress -- after a long 
sleep in which the clause has become a meaningless 
cliche [22].
To understand why rejuvenation of this clause may 
be desirable, it may be worth considering some 
parallels between copyright in the pre-modern era 
and copyright as it has evolved in the past decade or 
so (the trend toward which I will call "copyright in a 
post-modern era").  
CONSOLIDATION IN THE COPYRIGHT 
INDUSTRIES: The rise of publishing and media 
giants, such as Reed Elsevier, Time Warner, and 
Disney, harkens back to the dominance of certain 
London booksellers in the Stationers Company and 
their influence on copyright law and policy. As the 
work of James Boyle, among others, has shown, 
established copyright industries have lately been 
very successful in promoting their agenda in the 
policy arena as though their interests were the only 
interests about which policymakers should be 
concerned [23].
THE DECLINE OF THE AUTHOR/THE RISE OF 
THE WORK: As in the pre-modern era, the post-
noted, on "the work" and "the copyright," rather than 
on "authors" [24]. This post-modern copyright 
system promotes the interests of rightsholders in 
their works more than it promotes the interests of 
individual authors.  
THE DECLINE OF UTILITARIAN AND 
LEARNING PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT/ THE 
RISE OF PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: From the 
standpoint of dominant players in the copyright 
industries, the purpose of this law is to maximize 
revenues for the benefit of rights holders, not to 
provide just enough protection to incant creative 
activity, let alone to promote learning or innovation 
[25]. Hollywood may have recouped its investments 
in films many times over, but if there is any residual 
value in those films, Hollywood wishes to exploit 
that value. Especially clear proof that the utilitarian 
rationale for granting authors limited rights in their 
works have given way to pure rent- seeking behavior 
is the Congressional decision in 1998 to extend the 
copyright term for another twenty years [26].
THE DECLINE OF FAIR USE AND OTHER 
COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS: The pre-modern 
copyright system had no "fair use" or other public 
interest exceptions to the scope of publisher rights, 
nor did it seek to promote science, innovation, or 
freedom of expression, values which in the modern 
era, have given rise to such exceptions in the modern 
era [27]. Fair use and other limitations on the scope 
of copyright have been long regarded in U.S. 
copyright law as part of the social bargain of the 
copyright system [28]. However, U.S. policymakers 
in the 1990s have sometimes spoken of fair use and 
other limitations as an "unfair tax" on publishers 
[29]. They have also predicted that fair use will 
recede in importance because of the rise of licensing 
schemes through copyright owners can be 
compensated for uses of their works [30]. The 1994 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) arguably limits national 
authority to create exceptions and limitations that 
exploitations of their works [31]. Some 
representatives of the copyright industries have 
already expressed a desire to use this agreement to 
challenge fair use and other exceptions in national 
copyright laws [32].
PERPETUAL COPYRIGHTS: In the pre-modern era, 
copyrights were perpetual. In the modern era, 
copyrights have been limited in duration, long 
enough to enable authors and their immediate 
families to enjoy the benefits of value the authors 
created, but enriching the public domain thereafter. 
The decision of the U.S. Congress to extend the term 
of copyright for an additional twenty years suggests 
that copyright in the post-modern era may be on its 
way to becoming perpetual again (on the installment 
plan, as Peter Jaszi so wittily observed) [33].
THE DECLINE OF ORIGINALITY AS A 
MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINT ON PUBLISHER 
RIGHTS: If major information industry players, such 
as Reed Elsevier, have their way, Congress will soon 
adopt a new form of intellectual property protection 
for collections of information that will, in essence, 
obviate the need for any "originality" in an 
informational work in order for copyright or 
copyright-like protection to be available for it [34].
In addition, some firms, Microsoft prominent among 
them, claim copyright protection in digitized 
versions of public domain works [35]. If these works 
cannot be fully controlled by copyright because of 
lingering questions about the sufficiency of their 
originality, one can expect these firms to use mass-
market licenses to get protection for such digital 
works via the model licensing law known today as 
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code [36].
EXCESSIVE PRICING: In the post-modern era, as in 
the pre-modern era, complaints about excessive 
pricing or otherwise burdensome terms and 
conditions in licenses for copyrighted works has 
once again become common [37]. Universities have 
been especially vocal about excessive pricing of 
discourse about this issue in the U.S. is any serious 
consideration of the possibility of imposing 
compulsory licenses, legal licenses, or obligations to 
license on fair and reasonable terms as a way to 
counteract this problem.  
UNCLARITY ABOUT ORIGINS OF RIGHTS: In the 
post-modern, as in the pre-modern era, there is 
noticeable unclarity about the source of authority 
firms have for claiming rights in certain 
informational works. Do rights to license works on 
any terms or to technically protect copyrighted 
works derive from ownership or possession of a 
particular artifact, from intellectual property rights 
that might pertain to such an artifact, or from some 
other legally recognized or asserted right? In the pre-
modern era, printers considered their "copie" rights 
to derive from possession of manuscripts and 
investments in printing the contents of manuscripts 
[38]. In the post-modern era, claims of seemingly 
absolute rights to license works on all but 
unconscionable terms or to control access to 
protected works by encrypting them have an unclear 
provenance. Jessica Litman has pointed out that 
proposed Article 2B posits the existence of property 
rights in information other than those arising from 
intellectual property law without specifying exactly 
what those rights are or how far they extend [39].
PRIVATE ORDERING/PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT:
Also evident in the post-modern copyright era is a 
renewed romance with private ordering. Julie Cohen 
has explored similarities between prevalent rhetoric 
of commercial exploiters of informational works and 
rhetoric from a now discredited Supreme Court 
decision that challenged public policy limitations on 
freedom of contract [40]. Though Cohen's analysis is 
powerful, an even more striking example of private 
ordering affecting informational works is the 
stationers copyright system. Studying the history of 
this system reveals why leaving the exploitation of 
informational works solely to private ordering can 
have serious deleterious consequences for society, in 
dissemination of learning [41]. As in the pre-modern 
era, industry groups in the post-modern era have 
played significant roles in policing compliance with 
copyright norms. Well known is the "hotline" the 
Software Publishers' Association provides through 
which disgruntled employees and the like can inform 
on their employers for unlicensed software [42].
THE RHETORIC OF "PIRACY" AND 
"BURGLARY": Characterizing unauthorized copying 
as "piracy" has both pre- and post-modern roots. In 
the pre-modern era, the so-called "pirates" were 
printers not belonging to the Stationers Company 
[43]. Today "pirates" seem to come in many shapes 
and sizes. Increasingly common is use of the term 
"piracy" to refer to single acts of infringement by 
individuals. Major firms in the post-modern 
copyright industries are using, or planning to use, 
technical protection systems to protect their works 
from such "piracy" [44]. They do not intend to rely 
solely on this form of private ordering to protect 
their interests. They have persuaded Congress to 
outlaw the act of bypassing of technical protection 
systems used by copyright owners to control access 
to their works, as well as technologies that can be 
used for access-control or use-control purposes [45].
They liken such bypassing to "burglary" and the 
technologies for bypassing to "burglary tools" [46].
The anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act, while ambiguous in some 
key respects, provides legal reinforcement for this 
private ordering, with criminal penalties for willful 
violators of these norms [47].
INCREASED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: The rhetoric 
of piracy lends itself to increased use of criminal 
penalties to enforce anti-copying norms. Post-
modern copyright, like pre-modern copyright, 
increasingly looks to criminal law to punish bad 
actors in the copyright space. In the modern era, 
criminal penalties were reserved for large-scale 
commercial infringers. In the post-modern era, 
copyright crimes are proliferating. Some of these do 
liability; others, notably the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA, require no underlying act 
of infringement.  
The social, political, and economic context within 
which these post-modern developments are 
occurring, as well as a continuing belief in modern 
copyright precepts by members of the judiciary, 
obviously distinguish the post-modern from the pre-
modern copyright era. It would be unduly alarmist to 
suggest that post-modernism has totally captured 
copyright law or that copyright law will get divorced 
from freedom of expression principles in order to 
remarry censorship. What may save copyright's 
second marriage from doom may well be this larger 
context. Yet, it would be naive not to notice the drift 
toward a renewed flirtation with censorship 
principles and do nothing to stop it.  
Working against the enactment of Article 2B is 
probably the most significant step that could be 
taken to arrest this flirtation. Article 2B works off 
the base of copyright, finding in it "informational 
rights" that then can be licensed under the Article 2B 
aegis. As other copyright scholars have noted, this 
model law treats copyright limitations as 
presumptively precatory and capable of being 
overridden by license terms [48]. Strong criticism of 
Article 2B from intellectual property law experts has 
led to a lessening of this presumption of the model 
law [49]. Article 2B now expressly empowers courts 
to withhold enforcement of contract clauses that 
violate "fundamental public policy" [50]. However, 
this limitation on licensor authority may be 
sufficiently vague as to provide little comfort to 
persons arguably subject to a free 
expression/copyright limitation override provision. 
Individual computer scientists, for example, may be 
deterred from posting on the Internet the results of 
performance tests on database programs whose 
license terms prohibit public dissemination of such 
results. These scientists may be personally 
convinced that public policies favoring the free 
enough to make such clauses unenforceable, but 
they may not be keen to invite litigation to challenge 
these restrictions. Also troublesome in mass-market 
licenses are clauses aimed at maintaining trade 
secrecy-like limitations on use of licensed 
information [51]. Such terms might include 
prohibitions on reverse-engineering, pledges not to 
disclose information, or statements of agreement 
with the unpublished nature of information. Such 
terms may generally be unobjectionable in the 
context of individually negotiated licenses between 
sophisticated parties with relatively even bargaining 
power. However, they become disturbing if the 
licensed work has been the subject of a mass-market 
transaction. Even though reverse-engineering 
computer program object code may be lawful as a 
matter of copyright law [52], license restrictions 
may inhibit exercise of this copyright-based 
privilege. It remains to be seen whether anti-
criticism/anti-reverse engineering clauses will 
proliferate and how courts will deal with them [53].
The potential certainly exists for Article 2B to be 
used to accomplish acts of private censorship that 
copyright and freedom of expression principles, left 
to their own devices, would disfavor.  
A more direct way in which copyright may enable 
private censorship arises from the new anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA. One 
provision of this law makes it illegal to circumvent a 
technical protection system used by a copyright 
owner to control access to its work [54]; another 
outlaws the manufacture or distribution of 
technologies primarily produced or designed to 
circumvent access controls [55]. To illustrate how 
this rule might impact first amendment values, 
consider this example: Suppose that an employee of 
a major chemical company gave a reporter a disk 
containing a digital copy of a report pertaining to a 
major chemical spill that the company was trying to 
cover up. If information on the disk is technically 
protected and the company has not authorized the 
employee to give the document to the reporter, the 
system to get access to the report would, on a strict 
interpretation of the anti-circumvention law, be 
illegal [56]. Also illegal, on a strict interpretation, 
would be the writing of a short program to enable 
the reporter to read the document in plaintext [57].
Consideration of free press and free speech interests 
might suggest that an act of circumvention for this 
purpose and the development of a tool to read the 
report were justifiable. One subsection of the 
DMCA's anti-circumvention provision states that 
"[n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish 
any rights of free speech or the press for activities 
using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or 
computing products" [58]. But how much comfort 
would this offer to the reporter or his newspaper? 
Congress realize the potential for the anti-
circumvention provision to conflict with free speech 
interests [59]. However, it provided very little 
guidance on how to mediate or resolve the tension 
between the interests of free speech and those 
underlying the anti-circumvention rule [60].
For copyright law to remain true to the modern 
aspiration to live in harmony with freedom of 
expression principles (and to remain divorced from 
censorship principles), those who deeply believe in 
its second marriage will need to be steadfast in 
monitoring the evolution of this policy. Post-
modernism has made considerable headway. 
However, the struggle is far from over. Much of the 
work that needs to be done to avert dire 
consequences is, oddly enough; work suitable to 
scholars of constitutional and copyright law. Peter 
Jaszi has identified the important task of developing 
a new and more powerful rhetoric that will allow us 
to maintain constitutionally grounded values in 
copyright law and policy [61]. Copyrights past will 
unquestionably be a prologue to its future. The 
principal question is: to which of its pasts shall we 
chart its course? Which choice we make will have 
profound consequences for the kind of information 
society in which we will be living in the twenty-first 
century [62].
* This paper has been prepared for an invitation-
only conference at Yale Law School on private 
censorship issues on April 9-11, 1999. It is a draft 
for discussion purposes, not a final paper. Please 
does not copy, redistribute, or quote from the paper 
in its present form unless you seek permission from 
the author.  
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